Summary

• Add report-framework-issue, an always-on (utilities / Meta) skill that turns a
  problem an adopter hits while using Magpie itself into a redacted GitHub issue
  on apache/magpie — the report-an-issue complement to setup-upstream-fix (fix PR).
• Why redaction: adopters run the framework against pre-disclosure CVE content on a private
  tracker, so a bare gh issue create risks leaking tracker / embargoed-CVE /
  private-list / cross-project content to a public repo. The load-bearing step is a
  mandatory public-disclosure scrub (8 categories) plus a safe_to_file gate that
  refuses to file reports whose essence is inherently confidential.

Type of change

• Skill change (.claude/skills/<name>/) — eval fixtures updated below
• Tool / bridge contract (tools/<system>/*.md)
• Python package (tools/*/ with pyproject.toml)
• Groovy reference impl
• Cross-cutting (RFC, AGENTS.md, sandbox, privacy-LLM)
• Documentation (docs/, README.md, CONTRIBUTING.md)
• Project template (projects/_template/)
• CI / dev loop (prek, workflows, validators)
• Other:

Test plan

• prek run --all-files passes
• For Python packages touched: uv run pytest / ruff check / mypy passes
• For Groovy bridges touched: command-line invocation tested end-to-end
• For skill changes: eval suite passes for the affected skill
  (PYTHONPATH=tools/skill-evals/src python3 -m skill_evals.runner tools/skill-evals/evals/<skill>/)
• For skill behaviour changes: a new or updated eval fixture is included in this PR
  (a regression test for the bug fixed / the behaviour added — see CONTRIBUTING.md)
• Other:

RFC-AI-0004 compliance

• HITL — any new mutation is gated on explicit user confirmation
• Sandbox — no new unrestricted host access; network reach declared in the adapter
• Vendor neutrality — placeholders (<PROJECT>, <tracker>, <upstream>, <security-list>) used in all skill / tool prose (the check-placeholders prek hook is the mechanical gate)
• Conversational + correctable — agentic-override path documented if behaviour is adopter-tunable
• Write-access discipline — no autonomous outbound messages; drafts only, sent on confirmation
• Privacy LLM — private content does not reach a non-approved LLM; redactor invoked where needed

Linked issues

Notes for reviewers (optional)

• Security-sensitive surface worth extra eyes: Step 2's 8-category scrub cascade and the
  safe_to_file: false → route-privately behaviour — they enforce the AGENTS.md confidentiality
  rules on a public destination.
• Footprint: 1 SKILL.md + 18 tiny eval fixtures + 3 catalog edits + 1 regenerated score doc + 3 symlinks.